### T—Reduce

#### We meet—amending a restriction is the same as repealing it

Beth, 3 -- CRS legislative process specialist (Richard, "How Bills Amend Statues," Congressional Research Service report, 8-4-03, lugar.senate.gov/services/pdf\_crs/senate/procedure/How\_Bills\_Amend\_Statutes.pdf, accessed 9-24-12, mss)

Many bills proposed … explicit amendment.

**Counter-interpretation—**

**Reduce means to bring down to a smaller extent—that’s Collins English Dictionary ‘9.**

**A restriction is a limitation by statute or regulation**

**Burton’s Legal Thesaurus ‘7**

(Burton's Legal Thesaurus, 4E. Copyright © 2007 by William C. Burton. Used with permission of The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc.)

restriction n. any limitation on activity, by statute, regulation or contract provision.

**In energy policy, regulations refer to controlling economic entities through rulemaking**

**Energy Information Administration ’12**

(Glossary of Terms, http://www.eia.gov/tools/glossary/index.cfm)

Regulation: The governmental function of controlling or directing economic entities through the process of rulemaking and adjudication.

**And, rulemaking refers to agency policies that have the force of law**

**Energy Information Administration ’12**

(Glossary of Terms, http://www.eia.gov/tools/glossary/index.cfm)

Rulemaking (regulations): The authority delegated to administrative agencies by Congress or State legislative bodies to make rules that have the force of law. Frequently, statutory laws that express broad terms of a policy are implemented more specifically by administrative rules, regulations, and practices.

### K

**Instrumental government focus solves agency**

**Kuzemko 12**

(Caroline Kuzemko, CSGR University of Warwick, Security, the State and Political Agency: Putting ‘Politics’ back into UK Energy, <http://www.psa.ac.uk/journals/pdf/5/2012/381_61.pdf>)

This observation brings us on to the way in which debates and narratives within political circles, particularly within parliament and amongst policymakers, started to shift. A plethora of new papers, debates and policy documents on energy emerged over this time, despite the round of energy reviews and the new White Paper that had been produced immediately prior to this period (see in particular Havard 2004; Ofgem 2004; DTI 2005a, 2005b, 2006a, 2006b and 2006c; JESS 2006). The energy sector became increasingly referenced in these proliferating policy and other government documents in terms of potential supply insecurity (FCO 2004; Straw in Plesch et al 2004). Echoing media, academic and think-tank narratives, direct links can be found between fears of supply insecurity and Russia (FAC 2008; see also House of Commons 2007; Ofgem 2009: 1). In particular, in 2007 the Foreign Affairs Committee (FAC) produced a report entitled ‘Global Security: Russia’ (FAC 2008). This is where we see how assumptions about resource nationalism and energy ‘politicisation’ as wrong affect perceptions (Straw in Plesch et al 2004; DTI 2007: 19). The FAC report focuses on certain political frameworks in non-OECD producer countries, particularly Russia, which may not allow new reserves to be developed properly making them ‘unstable’ suppliers (Havard 2004; FCO 2004). This in turn had negative implications for energy prices (Straw in Plesch et al 2004; DTI 2007: 19). What was also evident over this time, however, was the rising amount of reports produced by political institutions outside of those directly responsible for policymaking, the Energy Directorate of the DTI and the independent regulator, Ofgem. The Foreign Office, House of Commons committees and parliamentary offices, such as that of Science and Technology, all started to produce reports on energy focused on energy security (FCO 2004; POST 2004; Fox 2006; House of Lords 2006; House of Commons 2007; FAC 2007). Energy security was added, by the UK, to formal forums for international negotiation. In 2005, during the October EU Summit at Hampton Court, the issue of ‘energy security’ was added to the agenda (Offerdahl 2007). In a paper prepared for conference delegates energy is characterised as a sector which was by then becoming an issue of national security (Helm 2005b: 2). Increasing dependence on Russia for supplies of, particularly gas, is seen as a source of threat to the security of EU, and by extension UK, energy supply. Likewise, energy security was made top of the agenda in the G8 Summit of 2006 (G8 2006). In 2006 Prime Minister Tony Blair used his annual Lord Mayor’s speech to highlight energy security concerns (DTI 2006c: 4). Growing political interest in energy, outside of those institutions formally responsible for energy policymaking, indicates the extent to which energy was becoming subject, once more, to political debate and deliberation. What is also interesting to note at this time is the degree to which the deliberation of energy becomes formalised through various new institutions. In July 2004, in the immediate aftermath of the Yukos affair, the new Energy Act had conferred on the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry a fixed duty to report annually on energy security matters to Parliament (DTI 2005a). Thus a specific political process was put in place to revisit energy security at least annually. Changes related to the need to deliberate more formally had also started to take place within the DTI and FCO in that new resources were allocated to energy analysis (Interview 5). The 2007 White Paper acknowledged that energy had not up until the mid 2000s existed as a discrete area of foreign policy. Again, as such, it had less dedicated capacity assigned to it. The paper announced that, for the first time, the UK would have ...an integrated international energy strategy which describes the action we are taking to help deliver secure energy supplies and tackle climate change. (DTI 2007: 8) Concurrent with the degree to which energy was re-entering elite political debates at both the national and international levels, which in itself indicates a degree of deliberative repoliticisation, there were a number of policy alterations made relating to changing interpretations of energy and international markets. It could be argued that energy security had, in 2003, been assumed to exist, especially given the degree to which energy governance was still understood to be heading in a promarket direction (Thomas 2006: 583; Jegen 2009: 1; Lesage et al 2010: 6; EC 2011: 14). For example the energy supply objective had been worded such that the UK should continue to “maintain the reliability of… supplies” (DTI 2003: 11). Energy security, although still an objective, had been an assumed outcome of marketisation which explains why competitive markets had been the principal objective of energy policy at that time (cf. Helm 2005). By contrast, however, by 2007 energy security is understood to be something that needs to be established, as one of the ‘immense’ challenges facing the UK as a nation, and furthermore, to require further political action to achieve (DTI 2006c: Introduction and 4). This refocus of objectives onto achieving energy security, over time, added to the political pressures being brought to bear on energy policymakers given the degree to which supplies continued to be considered ‘insecure’ (Kuzemko 2012b: ). These changes in policy objectives, political institutions, and the addition of political capacity to deliberate energy are understood have taken place partly in response to political pressures to change emanating from outside energy policy circles, i.e. the DTI and Ofgem. Ofgem officials report a higher degree of ‘outside’ political interference in their practices (Interview 15), and it has been widely claimed that both the 2006 Energy Review and 2007 White Paper were researched and compiled specifically because the DTI and Ofgem understood the political need to respond to the crisis (CEPMLP 2006; House of Commons 2007a). As these processes of deliberation intensified it started also to become clear that the state had lost considerable capacity to understand the complexities of energy. Government was considered to be more responsible, given that the narrative was of national energy supply security, but lacking in information and knowledge both about what was happening and what to do about it. Ultimately this resulted in the formation of a new government institution, the Department of Energy and Climate Change (DECC), with specific mandates to deliver on energy and climate security.

**Our approach to the 1AC is valid**

**Owen ‘2**

(David Owen, Reader of Political Theory at the Univ. of Southampton, Millennium Vol 31 No 3 2002 p. 655-7)

Commenting on the ‘philosophical turn’ in IR, Wæver remarks that ‘[a] frenzy for words like “epistemology” and “ontology” often signals this philosophical turn’, although he goes on to comment that these terms are often used loosely.4 However, loosely deployed or not, it is clear that debates concerning ontology and epistemology play a central role in the contemporary IR theory wars. In one respect, this is unsurprising since it is a characteristic feature of the social sciences that periods of disciplinary disorientation involve recourse to reflection on the philosophical commitments of different theoretical approaches, and there is no doubt that such reflection can play a valuable role in making explicit the commitments that characterise (and help individuate) diverse theoretical positions. Yet, such a philosophical turn is not without its dangers and I will briefly mention three before turning to consider a confusion that has, I will suggest, helped to promote the IR theory wars by motivating this philosophical turn. The first danger with the philosophical turn is that it has an inbuilt tendency to prioritise issues of ontology and epistemology over explanatory and/or interpretive power as if the latter two were merely a simple function of the former. But while the explanatory and/or interpretive power of a theoretical account is not wholly independent of its ontological and/or epistemological commitments (otherwise criticism of these features would not be a criticism that had any value), it is by no means clear that it is, in contrast, wholly dependent on these philosophical commitments. Thus, for example, one need not be sympathetic to rational choice theory to recognise that it can provide powerful accounts of certain kinds of problems, such as the tragedy of the commons in which dilemmas of collective action are foregrounded. It may, of course, be the case that the advocates of rational choice theory cannot give a good account of why this type of theory is powerful in accounting for this class of problems (i.e., how it is that the relevant actors come to exhibit features in these circumstances that approximate the assumptions of rational choice theory) and, if this is the case, it is a philosophical weakness—but this does not undermine the point that, for a certain class of problems, rational choice theory may provide the best account available to us. In other words, while the critical judgement of theoretical accounts in terms of their ontological and/or epistemological sophistication is one kind of critical judgement, it is not the only or even necessarily the most important kind. The second danger run by the philosophical turn is that because prioritisation **of ontology** and epistemologypromotes theory-construction from philosophical first principles, it cultivates **a theory-driven** rather than problem-driven **approach** to IR. Paraphrasing Ian Shapiro, the point can be put like this: since it is the case that there is always a **plurality of** possible **true descriptions** of a given action, event or phenomenon, the challenge is to decide which is the most apt in terms of getting a perspicuous grip on the action, event or phenomenon in question given the purposes of the inquiry; yet, from this standpoint, ‘theory-driven work is part of a **reductionist** program’ in that it ‘dictates always opting for the description that calls for the explanation that flows from the preferred model or theory’.5 The justification offered for this strategy rests on the mistaken belief that it is necessary for social science because general explanations are required to characterise the classes of phenomena studied in similar terms. However, as Shapiro points out, this is to misunderstand the enterprise of science since ‘whether there are general **explanations** for classes of phenomena **is a question** for social-scientific inquiry, **not to be prejudged** before conducting that inquiry’.6 Moreover, this strategy easily slips into the promotion of the pursuit of generality over that of empirical validity. The third danger is that the preceding two combine to encourage the formation of a particular image of disciplinary debate in IR—what might be called (only slightly tongue in cheek) ‘the Highlander view’—namely, an image of warring theoretical approaches with each, despite occasional temporary tactical alliances, dedicated to the strategic achievement of sovereignty over the disciplinary field. It encourages this view because the turn to, and prioritisation of, ontology and epistemology stimulates the idea that there can only be one theoretical approach which gets things right, namely, the theoretical approach that gets its ontology and epistemology right. This image feeds back into IR exacerbating the first and second dangers, and so a potentially vicious circle arises.

**No root cause to the Aff**

**Curtler ’97** – PhD Philosophy

(Hugh, “rediscovering values: coming to terms with postnmodernism” 44-7)

The second and third concerns, though, are more serious and to a degree more legitimate. **The** second **concern is that** "**reason is** the product of the Enlightenment, modern science, and Western society, and as such for the postmodernists, it is **guilty by association of all** the errors attributed to them, [namely], **violence**, suffering, and alienation **in the twentieth century**, be it the Holocaust, world wars, Vietnam, Stalin's Gulag, or computer record-keeping . . ." (Rosenau 1992, 129). Although **this** is a serious concern, it **is hardly grounds for the rejection of reason**, for which postmodernism calls in a loud, frenetic voice. There is precious little evidence that the problems of the twentieth century are the result of too much reason! On the contrary. To be sure, it was Descartes's dream to reduce every decision to a calculation, and in ethics, this dream bore fruit in Jeremy Bentham's abortive "calculus" of utilities. But at least since the birth of the social sciences at the end of the last century, and with considerable help from logical positivism, ethics (and values in general) has been relegated to the dung heap of "poetical and metaphysical nonsense," and in the minds of the general populace, reason has no place in ethics, which is the proper domain of feeling. **The postmodern concern to place feelings at the center of ethics, and judgment generally**—which is the third of their three objections to modern reason—simply **plays into the hands of the hardened popular prejudice that has little respect for the abilities of human beings to resolve moral differences reasonably. Can it honestly be said of any major decision made in this century that it was the result of "too much reason" and that feelings and emotions played no part? Surely not. Can** this be said in the case of any of the concerns reflected in the list above: are **violence, suffering, and alienation, or the Holocaust, Vietnam, Stalin's Gulag, or Auschwitz the result of a too reasonable approach to human problems? No one could possibly make this claim** who has dared to peek into the dark and turbid recesses of the human psyche. In every case, it is more likely that **these concerns result from such things as sadism, envy, avarice, love of power, the "death wish," or short-term self-interest, none of which is "reasonable."**One must carefully distinguish between the methods ofthe sciences, which are thoroughly grounded in reason and logic, and the uses men and women make of science. The warnings of romantics such as Goethe (who was himself no mean scientist) and Mary Shelley were directed not against science per se but rather against the misuse of science and the human tendency to become embedded in the operations of the present moment. To the extent that postmodernism echoes these concerns, I would share them without hesitation. But the claim that our present culture suffers because of an exclusive concern with "reasonable" solutions to human problems, with a fixation on the logos, borders on the absurd.**What is required here is not a mindless rejection of human reason on behalf of "intuition," "conscience," or "feelings" in the blind hope that somehow complex problems will be solved if we simply do whatever makes us feel good. Feelings and intuitions are notoriously unreliable and cannot be made the center of a workable ethic.** We now have witnessed several generations of college students who are convinced that "there's no disputing taste" in the arts and that ethics is all about feelings. As a result, it is almost impossible to get them to take these issues seriously. The notion that we can trust our feelings to find solutions to complex problems is little more than a false hope.**We are confronted today with problems on a scale heretofore unknown, and what is called for is patience, compassion (to be sure), and above all else, clear heads. In a word, what is called for is a balance between reason and feelings—not the rejection of one or the other.** One need only recall Nietzsche's own concern for the balance between Dionysus and Apollo in his Birth of Tragedy. Nietzscheknew better than his followers, apparently, that one cannot sacrifice Apollo to Dionysus in the futile hope that we can rely on our blind instincts to get us out of the hole we have dug for ourselves.

**Extinction first—every being has life, have to save the most lives possible**

**BERNSTEIN ‘2**

(Richard J., Vera List Prof. Phil. – New School for Social Research, “Radical Evil: A Philosophical Interrogation”, p. 188-192)

There is a basic value inherent in **organic** being, a basic affirmation, "The Yes' of Life" (IR 81). 15 "The self-affirmation of being becomes emphatic in the opposition of life to death. Life is the explicit confrontation of being with not-being. . . . The 'yes' of all striving is here sharpened by the active `no' to not-being" (IR 81-2). Furthermore — and this is the crucial point for Jonas — this affirmation of life that is in all organic being has a binding obligatory force upon human beings. This blindly self-enacting "yes" gains obligating force in the seeing freedom of man, who as the supreme outcome of nature's purposive labor is no longer its automatic executor but, with the power obtained from knowledge, can become its destroyer as well. He must adopt the "yes" into his will and impose the "no" to not-being on his power. But precisely this transition from willing to obligation is the critical point of moral theory at which attempts at laying a foundation for it come so easily to grief. Why does now, in man, that become a duty which hitherto "being" itself took care of through all individual willings? (IR 82). We discover here the transition from is to "ought" — from the self-affirmation of life to the binding obligation of human beings to preserve life not only for the present but also for the future. But why do we need a new ethics? The subtitle of The Imperative of Responsibility — In Search of an Ethics for the Technological Age — indicates why we need a new ethics. Modern technology has transformed the nature and consequences of human action so radically that the underlying premises of traditional ethics are no longer valid. For the first time in history human beings possess the knowledge and the power to destroy life on this planet, including human life. Not only is there the new possibility of total nuclear disaster; there are the even more invidious and threatening possibilities that result from the unconstrained use of technologies that can destroy the environment required for life. The major transformation brought about by modern technology is that the consequences of our actions frequently exceed by far anything we can envision. Jonas was one of the first philosophers to warn us about the unprecedented ethical and political problems that arise with the rapid development of biotechnology. He claimed that this was happening at a time when there was an "ethical vacuum," when there did not seem to be any effective ethical principles to limit ot guide our ethical decisions. In the name of scientific and technological "progress," there is a relentless pressure to adopt a stance where virtually anything is permissible, includ-ing transforming the genetic structure of human beings, as long as it is "freely chosen." We need, Jonas argued, a new categorical imperative that might be formulated as follows: "Act so that the effects of your action are compatible with the permanence of genuine human life"; or expressed negatively: "Act so that the effects of your action are not destructive of the future possibility of such a life"; or simply: "Do not compromise **the conditions for** an indefinite continuation of humanity on earth**"; or again turned positive:** "In your present choices, include the future wholeness of Man among the objects of your will." (IR 11)

**Reprocessing reduces toxic quantity of nuclear waste**

**Lee 10**

(Nathan R. Lee, WISE Intern and B.S.E. in Materials Science & Engineering from UPenn, Sustainability Of U.S. Nuclear Energy: Waste Management And The Question Of Reprocessing American Nuclear Society, 2010, http://www.wise-intern.org/journal/2010/NathanLeeWISE2010.pdf)

In the long term, one begins to see the true benefits of the recycling options. The total relative radiotoxicity of the waste—the most important indicator in the long-term—exponentially improves with degree of recycling (Fig. 9). Although engineers attempted to design Yucca Mountain to minimize radiation release for a million years into the future, the confidence with which they, or even we as a society, can plan for scenarios on that timescale is low. Under the plutonium recycling scheme, the radiotoxicity of the waste falls to the level of natural uranium after 10,000 years—a more reasonable but still daunting number. Only under the full actinide recycle does the timeframe of concern drop below a millennium, where finally our predictive capacity becomes adequately reliable. With this fuel cycle, the long-term burden our society is placing on the future can be measured and mitigated. With regard to the long-term consequences to siting and engineering HLW repositories, there is certainly a net benefit in implementing either recycling scheme. Both separate the uranium from the used fuel, significantly reducing the HLW volume being sent to the repository. Moreover, the reduction in total fuel consumption from recycling, which is modest for one-pass Pu and dramatic for the full recycle, reduces **total HLW production**. As a result, **fewer repositories would need to be sited** in the future, lessening political controversy. The full recycle has the added benefit of removing the actinides that are the dominant long-term heat sources, increasing the allowed packing density of waste by a factor of 4.3 to 5.4 and thereby further reducing repository demand. 36

**Massive ionizing radiation release causes extinction—it’s a linear risk**

**Bertell ‘00**

(Dr. Rosalie Bertell, American physician and epidemiologist and winner of several awards, including the Hans-Adalbert-Schweigart-Medal (1983), Right Livelihood Award (1986) World Federalist Peace Award, Ontario Premier's Council on Health, Health Innovator Award, the United Nations Environment Programme Global 500 award, and the Sean MacBride International Peace Prize[3] “Part One: The Problem: Nuclear Radiation and its Biological Effects”, No Immediate Danger, Prognosis for a Radioactive Earth, The Book Publishing Company, 2000)

In 1964 Hermann Müller published a paper, `Radiation and Heredity', spelling out clearly the implications of his research for genetic effects (damage to offspring) of ionising radiation on the human species.[17] The paper, though accepted in medical/biological circles, appears not to have affected policy makers in the political or military circles who normally undertake their own critiques of published research. Müller **predicted the gradual reduction of the survival ability of the human species as several generations were damaged through exposure to ionising radiation**. This problem of genetic damage continues to be mentioned in official radiation-health documents under the heading `mild mutations'[18] but these mutations are not `counted' as health effects when standards are set or predictions of health effects of exposure to radiation are made. There is a difficulty in distinguishing mutations caused artificially by radiation from nuclear activities from those which occur naturally from earth or cosmic radiation. A mild mutation may express itself in humans as an allergy, asthma, juvenile diabetes, hypertension, arthritis, high blood cholesterol level, slight muscular or bone defects, or other genetic `mistakes'. These defects in genetic make-up leave the individual slightly less able to cope with ordinary stresses and hazards in the environment. **Increasing the number of such genetic `mistakes**' in a family line, each passed on to the next generation, **while at the same time increasing the stresses and hazards in the environment**, leads to termination of the family line through eventual infertility and/or death prior to reproductive age. On a large scale, such a process leads to selective genocide of families or **species suicide**.[19].

#### Has the environmental impact of a nuclear war

**Ayala ‘3**

(Leah Ayala, “Nuclear Power Companies the Department of Energy: A Legal Remedy Magnifying Nuclear Ends”, Nevada Law Journal, Winter 2002, LexisNexis)

A very small amount of nuclear waste can be disastrous. If an amount of plutonium about the same size as a beach ball was properly dispersed, it could cause lung cancer in everyone on earth. R. Routley & V. Routley, Nuclear Energy and Obligations to the Future, 21 INQUIRY 133, 136 (1978). See generally Robin Dusek, Lost in Space?: The Legal Feasibility of Nuclear Waste Disposal in Outer Space, 22 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV. 181 (1997). Some estimate that a large release of nuclear waste from Yucca Mountain, which has a capacity to hold 77,000 metric tons of waste, **would *exceed* the environmental impact of a nuclear war**. This is a huge amount of waste compared to the "few dozen pounds" of waste released in the Chernobyl explosion that is estimated will result in between 17,000 to 475,000 human deaths from cancer. Broad, supra note 132. Each of the spent fuel assemblies that will be stored in the repository contains a similar amount of radioactivity as ten Hiroshima bombs. Lazarus, supra note 1 (citing Klaus Schumann, a Green Party activist and member of the San Luis Obispo County Nuclear Waste Management Committee).

**A stable system of deterrence prevents nuclear war – it create a stable ontological context for interaction and expectations**

**Lupovici 8** (Amir, Post-Doctoral Fellow Munk Centre for International Studies, Why the Cold War Practices of Deterrence are Still Prevalent: Physical Security, Ontological Security and Strategic Discourse, [http://www.cpsa-acsp.ca/ papers-2008/Lupovici.pdf](http://www.cpsa-acsp.ca/papers-2008/Lupovici.pdf), AD: 9/22/10) jl

Since deterrence can become part of the actors’ identity, it is also involved in the actors’ will to achieve ontological security, securing the actors’ identity and routines. As McSweeney explains, ontological security is “the acquisition of confidence in the routines of daily life—the essential predictability of interaction through which we feel confident in knowing what is going on and that we have the practical skill to go on in this context.” These routines become part of the social structure that **enables and constrains** the **actors’ possibilities** (McSweeney, 1999: 50-1, 154-5; Wendt, 1999: 131, 229-30). Thus, through the emergence of the deterrence norm and the construction of deterrence identities, the actors create an intersubjective context and intersubjective understandings that in turn affect their interests and routines. In this context, deterrence strategy and deterrence practices are better understood by the actors, and therefore the continuous avoidance of violence is more easily achieved. Furthermore, within such a context of deterrence relations, rationality is (re)defined, clarifying the appropriate practices for a rational actor, and this, in turn, reproduces this context and the actors’ identities. Therefore, the internalization of deterrence ideas helps to explain how actors may create more cooperative practices and **break away** from the spiral of hostility that is forced and maintained by the identities that are attached to the **security dilemma**, and which lead to mutual perception of the other as an aggressive enemy. As Wendt for example suggests, in situations where states are **restrained from** using **violence**—such as MAD (mutual assured destruction)—states not only avoid violence, but “ironically, may be willing to **trust each other** enough to take on collective identity”. In such cases if actors believe that others have no desire to engulf them, then it will be easier to trust them and to identify with their own needs (Wendt, 1999: 358-9). In this respect, the norm of deterrence, the trust that is being built between the opponents, and the (mutual) constitution of their role identities may all lead to the creation of long term influences that preserve the practices of deterrence as well as the avoidance of violence. Since a basic level of trust is needed to attain ontological security,21 the existence of it may further strengthen the practices of deterrence and the actors’ identities of deterrer and deterred actors. In this respect, I argue that for the reasons mentioned earlier, the practices of deterrence should be understood as providing both physical and ontological security, thus refuting that there is necessarily tension between them. Exactly for this reason I argue that Rasmussen’s (2002: 331-2) assertion—according to which MAD was about enhancing ontological over physical security—is only partly correct. Certainly, MAD should be understood as providing ontological security; but it also allowed for physical security, since, compared to previous strategies and doctrines, it was all about decreasing the physical **threat of nuclear weapons**. Furthermore, the ability to increase one dimension of security helped to enhance the other, since it strengthened the actors’ identities and created more stable expectations of **avoiding violence**.

**Rejecting strategic predictions of threats makes them inevitable—decisionmakers will rely on preconceived conceptions of threat rather than the more qualified predictions of analysts**

**Fitzsimmons, 07** (Michael, “The Problem of Uncertainty in Strategic Planning”, Survival, Winter 06/07)

But handling even this weaker form of uncertainty is still quite challeng- ing. If not sufficiently bounded, a high degree of variability in planning factors can exact a significant price on planning. The complexity presented by great variability strains the cognitive abilities of even the most sophisticated decision- makers.15 And even a robust decision-making process sensitive to cognitive limitations necessarily sacrifices depth of analysis for breadth as variability and complexity grows. It should follow, then, that in planning under conditions of risk, variability in strategic calculation should be carefully tailored to available analytic and decision processes. Why is this important? What harm can an imbalance between complexity and cognitive or analytic capacity in strategic planning bring? Stated simply, where analysis is silent or inadequate, **the personal beliefs of decision-makers** **fill the void**. As political scientist Richard Betts found in a study of strategic sur- prise, in ‘an environment that lacks clarity, abounds with conflicting data, and allows no time for rigorous assessment of sources and validity, ambiguity allows intuition or wishfulness to drive interpretation ... The greater the ambiguity, the greater the impact of preconceptions.’16 The decision-making environment that Betts describes here is one of political-military crisis, not long-term strategic planning. But a strategist who sees uncertainty as the central fact of his environ- ment brings upon himself some of the pathologies of crisis decision-making. He invites ambiguity, takes conflicting data for granted and **substitutes a priori scepticism about the validity of prediction** for time pressure as a rationale for discounting the importance of analytic rigour. It is important not to exaggerate the extent to which data and ‘rigorous assessment’ can illuminate strategic choices. Ambiguity is a fact of life, and scepticism of analysis is necessary. Accordingly, the intuition and judgement of decision-makers will always be vital to strategy, and attempting to subordinate those factors to some formulaic, deterministic decision-making model would be both undesirable and unrealistic. All the same, there is danger in the opposite extreme as well. Without careful analysis of what is relatively likely and what is relatively unlikely, what will be the possible bases for strategic choices? A decision-maker with no faith in prediction is left with little more than a set of worst-case scenarios and his existing beliefs about the world to confront the choices before him. Those beliefs may be more or less well founded, but if they are not made explicit and subject to analysis and debate regarding their application to particular strategic contexts, they remain only beliefs and premises, rather than rational judgements. Even at their best, such decisions are likely to be poorly understood by the organisations charged with their implementation. At their worst, such decisions may be poorly understood by the decision-makers themselves.

Debating nuclear scenario planning key to engage in expert debates and prevent nuclear war

Harvard Nuclear Studies Group, 1983 (Albert Carnesale, Professor of Public Policy and Academic Dean of Harvard’s John F. Kennedy School of Government, Paul Doty, Director of the Center for Science and International Affairs and Mallinckrodt Professor of Biochemistry at Harvard, Stanley Hoffmann, Chairman of the Center for European Studies and Douglass Dillon Professor of the Civilization of France at Harvard, Samuel P. Huntington, Director of the Center for International Affairs and Clarence Dillon Professor of International Affairs at Harvard, Joseph S. Nye Jr., Professor of Government at Harvard, and Scott D. Sagan, Living with Nuclear Weaposn, pp. 7-9)

The debates over national security policy are often extremely confusing. One source of confusion is that advocates of different policies focus on different threats in their public presentations. The "layman" hears one "expert" outline how horrible a nuclear war between the superpowers would be, and on that basis argue for a policy of disarmament. Then another "expert" concen­trates on the Soviet Union's massive arms buildup, its treatment of its own people, and its ideology, and argues that the United States must therefore build up its nuclear arsenal. Common sense, however, tells most people that these two problems—the threat of nuclear war and the threat of the Soviet Union—should not be treated separately. They are two sides of the same coin: how to best preserve American security in the nuclear age. What the interested citizen lacks is not the arguments supporting a particular position, but rather an analysis of the pertinent informa­tion as well as the full range of nuclear issues. Before hearing another debate on whether to build the MX mis­sile or whether to ratify SALT II, what's necessary is to know how to put all these issues into perspective. And they are seldom well served by merely hearing two incom­patible extremes. What is the nuclear debate all about? How did we get here? What should our strategy be? What policy options does the United States and its allies have? What can be done about the nuclear predicament? This is the niche that this book seeks to fill. For the most part, it does not advocate any single position, nor does it offer any single solution to the problems of nuclear policy. Although we will suggest some policy directions and argue against others, our primary concern is education. What we do advocate is that interested citizens learn more about nuclear weapons policy. If the concerned public is to fill an enlarged role in policymaking, to move beyond the present focus on fear of nuclear war and search for ways to avoid it, it has to examine numerous opinions, take in a good dose of history, absorb a number of facts, and explore the full range of issues involved.

### Elections

#### Romney will win now—resiliency and momentum

KTVQ 9-19. ["It's not all over for Romney" KTVQ News Coverage -- www.ktvq.com/news/it-s-not-all-over-for-romney/]

On Monday night, Romney was hit with what we might call a "pre-gaffe" when a private statement that he made months ago suddenly hit the Web. The video shows Romney apparently dismissing the 47% of Americans who he says don't pay federal income taxes as freeloaders. For someone who is often portrayed as cynical and uncaring, this is not good news. What will we see next? Leaked footage of Romney stealing candy from a baby?¶ There's cause for Republicans to panic. Some commentators are starting to ask, "Did Romney just lose the election?" When I first saw the "47%" video, I wrote that it had to damage Romney's already poor likeability ratings and maybe even cost him the White House. But, after a couple of days of reflection, I think there's still reason for Republicans to have hope. Not least because the polls point to a closer election than the headlines do. But I'll come to that in a moment.¶ First, it's helpful to put the "47%" speech into historical perspective, which suggests that "gaffes never matter." Every campaign has a moment when the candidate says something they shouldn't have, and it isn't necessarily the end of the road.¶ In April 2008, in the middle of his primary race against Hillary Clinton, Barack Obama gave a speech in which he said that poverty caused "bitter" people to "cling to guns or religion or antipathy to people who aren't like them." His opponents went wild, but this kind of "cat out of the bag" statement tends to matter far more to fervent activists than it does to ordinary voters. After all, Obama won the primary and the general election.¶ Four years later, it's only Republican activists who still say they are "proud to be clinging to my guns and religion" -- as if the statement has any contemporary relevance. In 2016, Democratic activists will probably be driving around with faded bumper stickers that read, "47 Percent -- And Proud!" The rest of us will have long forgotten what that means.¶ Over time, sober analysis might slowly turn in Romney's favor, too. Consider how Obama's words were taken out of context. He was really making a case for why liberals had to renew their efforts to improve people's finances, "to get people persuaded that we can make progress when there's not evidence of that in their daily lives."¶ Likewise, Romney was actually arguing that there was no point pitching his low tax policy to the 47% of Americans who already don't pay income taxes because ... they don't pay taxes.¶ What he meant by "I don't have to worry about them," was that he didn't need to court their vote. He wasn't saying that if he saw them begging in the street he'd drive his limo straight on by.¶ In fact, the "47%" speech reads a lot better on the page than it sounds on the video. Part of Romney's problem isn't the content of his ideas, but the ubiquitous context of wealth and power. His host was a one-percenter with a taste for extravagant parties, and Romney delivered his line as if sharing the inner workings of a Ponzi scheme.¶ Despite Romney's personality problem, he isn't doing nearly as badly in the polls as the punditry suggests. In fact, the day after the 47% video leaked, Gallup released a poll that showed the president only 1 percentage point ahead of the Republican challenger. Ironically, the pollster also reported that he has surprising support among people with low incomes. This would seem to prove that Obama's convention bounce was only temporary and that he remains vulnerable.¶ More importantly, the public hasn't punished Romney for a serious gaffe he made over Egypt. Critics accused him of jumping the gun when he lambasted a statement released by the U.S. Embassy in Cairo condemning a film considered offensive to Islam -- protests against which later resulted in the death of four Americans in Libya. If they're prepared to forgive him for that snafu, perhaps they'll ignore this one, too.¶ Take a look at the electoral map and you'll see that Obama has momentum in the swing states. But not much. According to RealClearPolitics' average of polls, he's ahead 4.2 percentage points in Ohio, 3 points in Virginia, 2.7 points in Wisconsin, and 1.4 points in Florida. That puts Romney well within striking distance and that's even before he's had a chance to land some punches in the debates.

**Can’t predict the election—Black Swans**

**PBS ’12**

**(“Black swan events”, 9-7-2012,** <http://www.pbs.org/wnet/need-to-know/video/video-black-swan-events/14768/>)

Finally, it was more than 130 years ago that cartoonist Thomas Nast popularized the symbols that have defined the two parties ever since: the Democratic donkey and the Republican elephant. But this year, and in fact back across many election years, the most significant animal may be…a swan. Specifically, a black swan. As coined by author Nassim Taleb in his books, “Fooled by Randomness” and then “The Black Swan,” it refers to a highly unlikely, unanticipated event that, when it happens produces hugely consequential results. Like the global financial meltdown just weeks before the 2008 presidential election. That “black swan” had a huge political impact as well. Remember: within two days of each other in September 2008, Lehmann Brothers collapsed; and AIG was saved from extinction by an $85 billion bailout. As a result, the stock market lost hundreds and hundreds of points. With that, every assumption of the 2008 campaign, every premise that had governed two years of that campaign, was rendered “inoperative.” Many Republicans still believe that, but for that meltdown, McCain might have won–or at least, made it a lot closer. But it’s hardly the only example. Again and again, random, sometimes shocking events have reshaped campaigns at every level. Most dramatic was the assassination of Robert Kennedy in 1968, moments after he declared victory in the California primary. We’ll never know if he would have won the nomination or election–but he was clearly in contention; his death made the nomination of Hubert Humphrey inevitable. Sudden death has reshaped other campaigns: most recently, in 2002, when Minnesota Senator Paul Wellstone was killed in a plane crash 11 days before Election Day. Former Vice President Walter Mondale replaced him on the ticket, and lost to Norm Coleman; giving the Republicans a crucial Senate seat. But it’s not just death that arrives on the Black Swan. Go back to 1960, when Richard Nixon was actively competing for the black vote against John Kennedy. In late October, Martin Luther King, Jr was arrested in Georgia on a highly questionable parole violation, and locked up in a rural jail; fears for his safety rose. On successive days, John Kennedy called King’s wife, and Robert Kennedy called a local judge to ask about bail. When King was released, his father–an influential black minister who had endorsed Nixon–reportedly because he feared a Catholic in the White House–switched his support to JFK. When you look at how close the vote was in key states with large black populations–one per cent in New Jersey, two per cent in Michigan, a virtual tie in Illinois–it’s not too much to say that those phone calls elected John Kennedy. What Black Swans might show up this fall? A European economic collapse? A bad stumble on the campaign trail? Something much more grim? That’s the whole point about black swans…you can’t predict them. But you’ll know ‘em when you see ‘em.”

**Energy not key to the election**

**Cleantech Finance ’12**

**(“VP announcement reinforces stark differences on energy issues for November”, 8-14-2012,** <http://www.cleantechfinance.net/tag/election/>)

But this also raises another question. Just how important is energy policy to the voting public? Energy and environmental issues repeatedly rank low when it comes to issues that matter to the general electorate. In fact, a recent study by research organization Public Agenda found that more than half of Americans cannot name one type of renewable energy and nearly 40 percent can’t identify a fossil fuel. Many incorrectly believe that the US gets most of its oil from the Middle East. An Associated Press-NORC Center for Public Affairs Research poll found that less than 20 percent of Americans know important details about policies that could save them a lot of money, including energy efficiency rebates, tax credits, and other incentives.

**Voters are already decided—plan irrelevant**

**Lazarick ’12 – former State House bureau chief of the Baltimore Examiner**

**(Len, has also taught Asian history at Montgomery College, Md., and state and local government at Howard Community College, “Commentary: Most minds now made up on presidential race; 13 keys to White House predicts winner”, Maryland Reporter, 9-9-2012,** <http://marylandreporter.com/2012/09/09/commentary-most-minds-now-made-up-on-presidential-race-13-keys-to-white-house-predicts-winner/>)

With the party conventions over, it is safe to predict that all the fuss and blather have changed the minds of very few people. Same goes for all the political coverage of the conventions, including the stuff I produced in Charlotte and the stories I ran on my MarylandReporter.com website about Tampa. In-depth polling and analysis indicates that most people have already made up their minds about which presidential candidates they will vote for – or at least whom they will vote against. Perhaps 10% of the electorate is in play and truly undecided. Those people who call themselves “independent” in fact consistently side with one party over the other.

**Public won’t pin the plan on Obama**

**Mendelson ’10**

(Nina A., Disclosing “Political” Oversight of Agency Decision Making, 108 Mich. L. Rev. 1127 (2010).)

**Even if presidential supervision of agency decisions is well known to the voting population, holding a President accountable for particular agency decisions is hard** enough, given the infrequency of elections, the number of issues typically on the agenda at the time of a presidential election, presidencies that only last two terms, and presidential candidates who are vague about how the administrative state would run. 175 It is all the more difficult if the public does not know what influence the President may have had or may end up having on particular agency decisions. “**To the extent that presidential supervision of agencies remains hidden from public scrutiny, the President will have greater freedom to [assist] parochial interests.”** 176

### Natural Gas

**Russian economy growing and resilient – assumes current global crisis**

**Reuters 10/25/**11 (“Update 1-Russian economic growth gains speed in Q3” <http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/10/25/russia-economy-idUSL5E7LP46T20111025>)

Russia's gross domestic product (GDP) grew 5.1 percent in the third-quarter, the economy ministry said on Tuesday, with the figure meeting analyst expectations and suggesting economic expansion has gained speed in recent months. In September, GDP grew 5.7 percent year-on-year, Deputy Economy Minister Andrei Klepach said, which follows a 5.2 percent rise in August. "The third quarter was fairly positive for the economy ... we can talk about growth gaining in pace," Klepach told reporters. Reuters most recent poll showed that economists expect third-quarter economic expansion to reach 5.1 percent in annual terms. The data suggests that the country is on track to achieve official forecasts of 4.1 percent GDP growth this year. Klepach said that the ministry expects GDP growth to slow down in the fourth quarter to 3.8-3.9 percent. **The GDP data follows largely positive news from last week that showed Russia's economy remains seemingly resilient despite global economic turmoil and disappointing industrial output in September.**

No impact to Russian economy

Blackwill, 09 – former associate dean of the Kennedy School of Government and Deputy Assistant to the President and Deputy National Security Advisor for Strategic Planning (Robert, RAND, “The Geopolitical Consequences of the World Economic Recession—A Caution”, http://www.rand.org/pubs/occasional\_papers/2009/RAND\_OP275.pdf, WEA)

Now on to Russia. Again, five years from today. Did the global recession and Russia’s present serious economic problems substantially modify Russian foreign policy? No. (President Obama is beginning his early July visit to Moscow as this paper goes to press; nothing fundamental will result from that visit). Did it produce a serious weakening of Vladimir Putin’s power and authority in Russia? No, as recent polls in Russia make clear. Did it reduce Russian worries and capacities to oppose NATO enlargement and defense measures eastward? No. Did it affect Russia’s willingness to accept much tougher sanctions against Iran? No. Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov has said there is no evidence that Iran intends to make a nuclear weapon.25 In sum, Russian foreign policy is today on a steady, consistent path that can be characterized as follows: to resurrect Russia’s standing as a great power; to reestablish Russian primary influence over the space of the former Soviet Union; to resist Western eff orts to encroach on the space of the former Soviet Union; to revive Russia’s military might and power projection; to extend the reach of Russian diplomacy in Europe, Asia, and beyond; and to oppose American global primacy. For Moscow, these foreign policy first principles are here to stay, as they have existed in Russia for centuries. 26 None of these enduring objectives of Russian foreign policy are likely to be changed in any serious way by the economic crisis.

**Plan is necessary for Russian relations—Russian firms are interested in U.S. firms for reprocessing**

**Rojansky ’10**

(Matthew Rojansky, “As New START Debate Rages, Quiet Nuclear Progress With Russia”, U.S. News and World Report, 12-9-2010, <http://www.usnews.com/opinion/articles/2010/12/09/as-new-start-debate-rages-quiet-nuclear-progress-with-russia>)

Beyond benefiting relations, cooperation on peaceful nuclear energy makes financial sense. The United States and Russia have invested substantially in civilian nuclear research and development, and both share basic interests in capitalizing on the global "nuclear energy renaissance" by developing proliferation-resistant reactor technologies, increasing environmental safety, and making nuclear energy more economically competitive. And when it comes to civil nuclear power, Russia brings a lot to the table. For instance, the United States does not operate so-called "fast breeder" reactors and reprocessing facilities that don't produce nuclear waste that can be used for weapons, but Russia does. And, while the United States hasn't built a single new nuclear power plant since 1973, Russia opened its first fast breeder reactor that very year and plans to bring 26 new nuclear facilities online before 2030. And the Kremlin has already allocated some $3.6 billion for research on fast breeders and other projects under a program dedicated to the next generation of nuclear technology. With U.S. support, Russia has developed a sophisticated infrastructure to securely store spent nuclear fuel—and Moscow even offered to store and reprocess spent fuel from the United States, while no American state has been willing to do the same. Russian companies already supply roughly half of the uranium consumed in U.S. and European power plants and will need to supply more in the future as the United States is only able to produce a fifth—at most—of its nuclear fuel stock domestically. Fortunately, **Russia's nuclear industry is interested in expanding its** uranium enrichment and **reprocessing activity in the U.S. market and potentially cooperating with American firms, including GE and Westinghouse, on bids for contracts in other countries**. Closer U.S.-Russia cooperation on nuclear power means better nuclear security. As a major player in civil nuclear markets worldwide, Russia has a unique window into potential risks and opportunities to insist on measures that protect sensitive sites and technologies. Russia, with U.S. support, also has the chance to compete more effectively with China's nuclear industry, which is less scrupulous in its nonproliferation commitments. The importance of partnering with Russia was made clear during Secretary Clinton's recent trip to Central Asia. Belarus, the former Soviet republic, agreed to give up its stock of highly enriched uranium by 2012 in return for U.S. help in developing a new nuclear power reactor. But Russia has had its eye on this potentially lucrative project, and has the right experience to work effectively with Belarus's Soviet-era infrastructure. Washington should cooperate—instead of compete—with Moscow to build an environmentally safe, proliferation-proof reactor in Belarus. A quarter century after the Chernobyl disaster, **this would be a powerful symbol that both sides can move beyond the Cold War legacy.**

**Relations key to solve extinction- accesses every impact**

**TAYLOR ‘8** - Atlantic correspondent living in Moscow

(Jeffrey, Medvedev Spoils the Party, http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/200811u/medvedev-obama/2)

Like it or not, the United States cannot solve **crucial global problems** without Russian participation. Russia commands the largest landmass on earth; possesses vast reserves of oil, natural gas, and other natural resources; owns huge stockpiles of weapons and plutonium; and still wields a potent brain trust. Given its influence in Iran and North Korea, to say nothing of its potential as a spoiler of international equilibrium elsewhere, Russia is one country with which the United States would do well to reestablish a strong working relationship—a strategic partnership, even—regardless of its feelings about the current Kremlin government. The need to do so trumps expanding NATO or pursuing “full-spectrum dominance.” Once the world financial crisis passes, we will find ourselves returning to worries about resource depletion, environmental degradation, and global warming – the greatest challenges facing humanity. No country can confront these problems alone. For the United States, Russia may just prove the “indispensable nation” with which to face a volatile future arm in arm.

**Utilities are increasing reliance on nuclear power now—uprating**

**Plumer ‘12**

**(Brad Plumer, “How to expand nuclear power without attracting (too much) attention”, Washington Post, 7-18-2012, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/ezra-klein/wp/2012/07/18/how-to-increase-nuclear-power-without-attracting-attention/)**

Since the 1970s, construction on new nuclear reactors in the United States has largely ground to a halt, thanks to public protests, regulatory obstacles and tight financing. Yet over that same period, U.S. **utilities have managed to increase the amount of electricity they get from nuclear power. By quite a lot,** in fact. How is that possible? Through a process known as “uprating.” According to a new analysis by the U.S. Energy Information Administration, the operators of 98 of the country’s 104 commercial nuclear reactors have asked regulators for permission to boost capacity from their existing plants. All in all, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission has approved more than 6,500 megawatts worth of uprates since 1977. **That’s the equivalent of building six entirely new nuclear reactors**—and during a period when fresh plants were impossible to build.

**Zero link—reprocessing has marginal effect on cost of nuclear power**

**Lee 10**

**[Nathan R. Lee, WISE Intern and B.S.E. in Materials Science & Engineering from UPenn, Sustainability Of U.S. Nuclear Energy: Waste Management And The Question Of Reprocessing American Nuclear Society, 2010, http://www.wise-intern.org/journal/2010/NathanLeeWISE2010.pdf]**

Finally, it is important to note that the economic ramifications of changing the fuel cycle are quite small compared to other parts of the nuclear energy industry. Capital, operations, and maintenance account for 80-90% of total generation costs, dwarfing the significance of fuel cycle economics. Although fuel cycle costs are not immaterial, they should not be the principal driving factor in a policy decision. 48

**Nat gas and nuclear don’t compete—utilities will always rely on nuclear as a hedge**

**Lamonica ‘12**

**(Martin, “A Glut of Natural Gas Leaves Nuclear Power Stalled”, Technology Review by MIT, 8-9-2012, http://www.technologyreview.com/news/428737/a-glut-of-natural-gas-leaves-nuclear-power/)**

Even in United States, of course, super cheap natural gas will not last forever. With supply exceeding demand, some drillers are said to be losing money on natural gas, which could push prices back up. Prices will also be pushed upward by utilities, as they come to rely on more natural gas for power generation, says James. Ali Azad, the chief business development officer at energy company Babcock & Wilcox, thinks the answer is making nuclear power smaller, cheaper, and faster. His is one of a handful of companies developing small modular reactors that can be built in three years, rather than 10 or more, for a fraction of the cost of gigawatt-size reactors. Although this technology is not yet commercially proven, the company has a customer in the Tennessee Valley Authority, which expects to have its first unit online in 2021 (see "A Preassembled Nuclear Reactor"). "When we arrive, we will have a level cost of energy on the grid, which competes favorably with a brand-new combined-cycle natural gas plants when gas prices are between $6 to $8," said Azad. He sees strong demand in power-hungry China and places such as Saudia Arabia, where power is needed for desalination. Even if natural gas remains cheaper, utilities don't want to find themselves with an overreliance on gas, which has been volatile on price in the past, **so nuclear power will still contribute to the energy mix. "[Utilities] still continue [with nuclear] but with a lower level of enthusiasm—it's a hedging strategy,"** says Hans-Holger Rogner from the Planning and Economics Studies section of the International Atomic Energy Agency. "They don't want to pull all their eggs in one basket because of the new kid on the block called shale gas."